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ABSTRACT
This dissertation addresses the top two “most critical web-application security risks” by
combining two high-level contributions [1].
The first high-level contribution introduces and evaluates collaborative authentication,
or coauthentication, a single-factor technique in which multiple registered devices work together to authenticate a user [2, 3, 4]. Coauthentication provides security benefits similar
to those of multi-factor techniques, such as mitigating theft of any one authentication secret, without some of the inconveniences of multi-factor techniques, such as having to enter
passwords or biometrics. Coauthentication provides additional security benefits, including:
preventing phishing, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks; basing authentications on highentropy secrets that can be generated and updated automatically; and availability protections
against, for example, device misplacement and denial-of-service attacks. Coauthentication
is amenable to many applications, including m-out-of-n, continuous, group, shared-device,
and anonymous authentications. The principal security properties of coauthentication have
been formally verified in ProVerif, and implementations have performed efficiently compared
to password-based authentication.
The second high-level contribution defines a class of SQL-injection attacks that are based
on injecting identifiers, such as table and column names, into SQL statements [5]. An automated analysis of GitHub shows that 15.7% of 120,412 posted Java source files contain code
vulnerable to SQL-Identifier Injection Attacks (SQL-IDIAs). We have manually verified that
some of the 18,939 Java files identified during the automated analysis are indeed vulnerable
to SQL-IDIAs, including deployed Electronic Medical Record software for which SQL-IDIAs
enable discovery of confidential patient information. Although prepared statements are the
vi

standard defense against SQL injection attacks, existing prepared-statement APIs do not
protect against SQL-IDIAs. This dissertation therefore proposes and evaluates an extended
prepared-statement API to protect against SQL-IDIAs.

vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Web applications have become increasingly popular and ubiquitous with the popularity of
mobile and Internet of Things devices. Web applications are also common targets of attacks,
through injection, broken authentication, sensitive data exposure, cross-site scripting, and
related vectors [1]. The top two “most critical” web-application vulnerabilities are
1. injection attacks and
2. broken authentication [1].
This dissertation addresses these top two vulnerabilities by (1) introducing and evaluating a novel authentication technique called collaborative authentication, and (2) defining
and evaluating the prevalence of a class of SQL-Injection attacks that are based on injecting identifiers (e.g., table and column names). This chapter

1

introduces the collaborative

authentication and a new class of SQL-Injection attacks.

1.1

Collaborative Authentication
With the growth of the Internet of Things, ubiquitous computing, and wearable, edi-

ble, and implantable devices, the overwhelming majority of adults may soon have multiple
personal smart devices accessible at all times, all of which can be registered and used to
authenticate. For example, to log in to a website, open a door, or start an engine, two of
1

Parts of this chapter is published in ACM Symposium on Applied Computing [4] and IEEE Conference on
Communications and Network Security [5]. Permissions to use these materials are provided in Appendix A.
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a user’s registered devices, perhaps a smartphone and smartwatch, might participate in the
authentication. A gate or garage door might authenticate a request to open by requiring
participation from both a registered car and a registered smartphone; then stealing only the
car, or only the phone, would be insufficient for opening the door.
Even today many people only authenticate to certain services when multiple of their
devices are present. For example, a user U may log in to banking services only from a
certain PC while in the presence of U ’s smartphone. In this case the banking service could
register these two user devices to U and require their participation in every authentication
of U . Because the PC and smartphone are separate and heterogeneous, successfully stealing
or otherwise attacking one device does not imply a successful attack on the other device. It
is therefore of value to protect against attacks on only one of the two user devices.
We call this single-factor technique, in which multiple devices collaborate to authenticate
a user, coauthentication [2, 3, 4, 6, 7]. The user devices collaborate through cryptographic
protocols, such that an authenticator receives message(s) proving that all required user
devices approve the authentication. Attackers who steal only one of the user devices cannot
authenticate, because the unstolen device will not approve the authentication.
Benefits of coauthentication include protecting against the compromise of authentication
secrets (cryptographic keys); preventing phishing, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks;
basing authentication on high-entropy secrets that can be generated and updated automatically; avoiding the inconveniences of factors like passwords and biometrics; implementing
advanced authentication functionalities, including m-out-of-n, continuous, group, shareddevice, and anonymous authentication; and, when implementing m-out-of-n authentication,
providing availability protections against device misplacement and denial-of-service attacks.

2

1.2

SQL-Identifier Injection Attacks
Injection attacks such as SQL-Injection Attacks (SQLIAs) continue to be considered the

most critical web-application vulnerabilities [1].
The following Java code provides a classic example of a SQLIA vulnerability.
String sql = "SELECT address FROM Customer WHERE password = '" + userInput + "'";
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(sql);

By entering an input such as 'OR true --, an attacker can make the executed query be
SELECT address FROM Customer WHERE password = '' OR true --'

where -- introduces a comment in SQL code and OR true bypasses the password check.
Under this attack, the executed query returns all addresses in the Customer table.
A particularly problematic subclass of SQLIAs involves the injection of identifiers into
SQL statements. We call such attacks SQL-Identifier Injection Attacks, or SQL-IDIAs [5].
As far as we are aware, this dissertation is the first to specifically define and address SQLIDIAs.
Identifiers may appear in SQL statements as, for example, names of tables, columns, indexes, databases, views, functions, procedures, or triggers. The following Java code demonstrates a SQL-IDIA vulnerability.
String sql = "SELECT * FROM Contact ORDER BY " + userInput;
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(sql);

Here the untrusted user input injects an identifier, referring to a column name in the
Contact table, according to which the results will be ordered. By entering an input such as
(CASE WHEN (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM Demographic WHERE firstName='John' AND lastName
='Doe') > 0 THEN Contact.lastName ELSE Contact.firstName END)

3

an attacker can observe the query results for the Contact table to infer whether John Doe
appears in the Demographic table. As described in Chapter 6, we have successfully mounted
such attacks against a deployed Electronic Medical Record web application to leak confidential information about patients.
SQL-IDIAs are of special interest because the existing standard SQLIA-preventing mechanisms (i.e., prepared statements) do not protect against SQL-IDIAs.

1.3

Contributions and Roadmap
The first contribution of this dissertation is a novel authentication technique called coau-

thentication; this dissertation introduces and evaluates coauthentication techniques, including several specific coauthentication system designs, protocols, and implementations. The
second contribution of this dissertation is a new class of attacks called SQL-Identifier Injection Attacks (SQL-IDIAs); this dissertation defines SQL-IDIAs, analyzes the usage of SQL
statements in source files from GitHub, and introduces an extended prepared-statement API
for preventing SQL-IDIAs.
As far as we are aware, coauthentication is the first single-factor, multi-device technique
for authenticating users without passwords or biometrics. Additionally, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that (1) defines SQL-IDIAs, (2) analyzes the usage of SQL
statements in source files from GitHub, or (3) introduces an extended prepared-statement
API for preventing SQL-IDIAs.
This dissertation is organized as following.
1. Chapter 2 presents the related work about authentication methods and SQL-Injection
attacks.
2. Chapter 3 presents coauthentication system designs, attack models, policies, applications, and coauthentication protocols.
4

3. Chapter 4 presents the formal verification of the principal security properties of the
coauthentication using ProVerif [8, 9]. Additionally, this chapter evaluates the implementability and performance of the coauthentication protocols.
4. Chapter 5 defines SQL-IDIAs. The definition is based on concatenating, into SQL
statements, identifiers that have propagated from untrusted inputs.
5. Chapter 6 analyzes 120,412 Java source files from GitHub to demonstrate the prevalence of SQL-IDIAs.
6. Chapter 7 introduces a new extended prepared-statement API to prevent SQL-IDIAs.
7. Chapter 8 concludes and presents the future work.
Much of the text presented in this dissertation are the combination and extension of two
published works [4, 5]. Permissions to use the materials of these papers are in Appendix A.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK

Web applications are vulnerable to many different attacks [1, 10], including:
• Injection attacks [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
• Broken authentication [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]
• Cross-site scripting (XSS) [22, 23, 24, 25]
• Attacks that exploit security misconfiguration [26, 27, 28, 29, 30]
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [31, 32, 33, 34, 35]
• Attacks that exploit wireless communication [36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41]
According to OWASP [1], injection attacks and broken authentication are the top two
“most critical” security risks [1]. In this chapter 1 , we focus on these top two vulnerabilities.

2.1

Authentication Methods
Authentication is one of the most common security activities end-users perform. Authen-

tication is also a common target of attacks, through phishing, guessing, man-in-the-middle,
token-theft, and related vectors. Due to the commonality of using and attacking authentication systems, even modest improvements to their security or usability may produce significant
benefits.
1
Parts of this chapter is published in ACM Symposium on Applied Computing [4] and IEEE Conference on
Communications and Network Security [5]. Permissions to use these materials are provided in Appendix A.
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2.1.1

Authentication Factors

As is well understood, user authentication is based on factors, the three standard factors
are
• what you know (human-entered secrets like passwords),
• what you have (physical tokens like keys, electronic remote controls, or smartcards),
and
• what you are (biometrics like fingerprints).
Every authentication system, regardless of the factors used, is based on secrets, which
could take the form of passwords, patterns of metallic teeth on keys, radio frequencies at
which devices transmit data, codes stored on devices and transmitted, fingerprints, etc.
Authentication systems aim to protect against attackers who have not obtained the required
secrets.
Each authentication factor has advantages and disadvantages [42]. Following subsections
present the main disadvantages of the common authentication techniques.

2.1.1.1

What-you-know-factor

Password authentication is the most commonly used what-you-know-factor authentication technique [43]. However, the traditional password authentication is vulnerable to many
well-studied attacks. For example, password authentication is vulnerable to guessing [44, 18],
phishing [45, 19, 46], DoS [47, 48, 49], and dictionary [19, 50, 45] attacks.
Password authentication also suffers from many usability drawbacks. Research has shown
that users rarely update their passwords [51]. Additionally, complex password policies decrease the usability. In particular, users often forget their passwords [52]. Due to the

7

complexity of passwords, users often write down secret password information on a piece of
paper.
Using password authentication on mobile devices creates additional vulnerabilities and
usability drawbacks. Research has shown that (1) it takes longer to type passwords on
phones, and (2) users make more mistake and get frustrated while typing passwords on
mobile devices [52]. Due to these problems, users tend to choose weaker passwords. Additionally, typing passwords on mobile devices may leak the password information via shoulder
surfing [53].

2.1.1.2

What-you-are-factor

Common what-you-are-factor authentication techniques are fingerprint scans, voice recognition, facial recognition, and iris or eye recognition. All of these techniques are based on
biometric information of humans. Biometric-based authentication methods are vulnerable
to secret duplication and replay attacks [42]. Additionally, the common disadvantage of the
biometric-based authentication method is the DoS problems due to the false matches and
limited attempts.
The main drawback of the biometric-based authentication techniques is that the users
cannot update their secret information. For example, if a user’s fingerprint is compromised,
the user cannot update his/her fingerprint information.

2.1.1.3

What-you-have-factor

Id cards, credit cards, security tokens are common examples of what-you-have-factor
authentication techniques. Each of these techniques is vulnerable to theft-based attacks. For
example, tokens are susceptible to theft, but doing so in the obvious way requires physical
access. Users will often notice physical theft of a token more readily than a remote theft or
guessing of a password or biometrics. However, tokens have traditionally relied on special8

purpose hardware and consequently been more expensive to implement and deploy than
other factors. In addition, usability benefits of tokens have traditionally been offset by the
costs of having to carry and handle the tokens [42, 54].

2.1.1.4

Multi-factor Authentication

Multi-factor authentication attempts to improve security by requiring successful attacks
to compromise every factor being used [55]. One two-factor mechanism combines a username
and password with a second password (a one-time password, OTP) texted to the user’s
phone [56]. Alternatively, instead of receiving an OTP from the authenticator, the phone
may share a cryptographic key with the authenticator and generate its own OTP, called a
time-based OTP or TOTP, as a cryptographic hash, using the shared key, of the current
time [57]. A benefit of such mechanisms is that the physical-token factor is a device already
possessed and carried by the user, thus avoiding expensive, dedicated hardware.
However, multi-factor techniques add the inconveniences of each factor required. For
example, because OTP and TOTP techniques require users to enter two passwords and
carry a registered device, they suffer from the nontrivial usability drawbacks of passwordbased authentication mechanisms (e.g., [58, 59, 51, 60, 52]) and the inconvenience of having
to access a mobile device to authenticate.

2.1.2

Threshold Schemes and Multi-Signatures

An (m, n) threshold scheme enables a secret to be divided among n entities, such that
each entity has one piece of the secret and m of the n pieces are required to determine the
secret [61]. An (m, n) threshold scheme has cryptographic benefits analogous to the userauthentication benefits of an m-out-of-n-device coauthentication policy; both protect against
fewer-than-m entities acting maliciously and at-most-n-minus-m entities being unavailable
to participate.
9

Multi-signature schemes similarly enable different users or devices to generate a joint
digital signature [62].
Threshold and multi-signature schemes do not provide coauthentication systems, and
vice versa, as they differ in techniques and goals. Threshold (multi-signature) schemes
contribute techniques for combining secret-pieces (signatures) into a joint secret (signature),
while coauthentication systems require no joint secret or signature. Coauthentication secrets
(i.e., keys) may be used only independently, to indicate one device’s participation in user-level
authentications, without ever being combined. The goals of threshold and multi-signature
schemes focus on combining pieces of cryptographic secrets or signatures into joint secrets
or signatures, while coauthentication’s goals focus on user authentication.

2.1.3

OTPs and Other Techniques Using Multiple Devices

One group of techniques related to coauthentication uses OTPs, as discussed. The standard use of OTPs is as follows. A user enters a username and password on a requestor
device, the authenticator SMS-texts an OTP to the user’s phone (which may also be the
requestor device), and the user sees the OTP and enters it on the requestor device as a second password required for authentication. This use of OTPs differs from coauthentication in
several ways, perhaps the most significant being that the OTPs are used in two-factor systems, while coauthentication is a single-factor system. Hence, attackers can break the OTP
portion of authentications by compromising one device, the victim’s phone, or by reading
the SMS messages sent to the phone [56, 63, 64].
Another related group of techniques use multiple devices to acquire multiple passwords
or biometric data [65]. The authenticator combines these data to determine whether to
authenticate a user. For example, if a user has a sensor-device implanted in each finger, then
each device may send data related to that finger’s motion to an authenticator, which can
make authentication decisions based on whether a user has moved or gestured in the proper
10

way for that user. Although using multiple devices, this line of work relies on users to enter
passwords or biometrics, which are assumed to be unguessable and unforgeable by attackers.
Coauthentication, like other zero- or low-interaction authentication systems [66], shields
users from attacks based on guessing or forging authentication secrets, such as password
phishing or biometric surveillance. Coauthentication users never have to access or even
understand the secrets required for authentication, and coauthentication secrets can be generated automatically, with high entropy, and without concern for whether humans have the
resources (cognitive ability, time, etc.) to generate, store, update, or enter the secrets.
Bonneau et al. evaluated authentication techniques, including OTPs, according to three
axes: usability, deployability, and security [67]. A total of 25 criteria are considered along
these axes, such as whether the techniques require users to memorize secrets or carry devices.
As motivated in Section 1, we consider disadvantages related to requiring users to carry
devices to be decreasing. In any case, we believe that coauthentication satisfies the majority
of Bonneau et al.’s criteria, though it is difficult to make precise claims in this respect, due to
subjectivity in the criteria [67, Section V-B]. The most significant criteria coauthentication
does not satisfy relate to deployability; deploying coauthentication, like deploying any new
authentication technique, would require updating authentication clients and servers, and in
some implementations, relying on co-location verification.

2.2

SQL-Injection Attacks
SQL-injection-attack vulnerable programs form SQL statements by concatenating un-

trusted inputs. Every concatenation of untrusted input into a SQL statement can produce
a SQLIA [15, 14]. Many mechanisms exist for mitigating SQL-Injection attacks. In this
section, we present these existing SQLIA mitigation techniques.
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2.2.1

Existing Methods

Due to the popularity of SQLIAs, several dynamic and static analysis methods have been
proposed. Dynamic methods (e.g., [15, 14]) and tools (e.g., [68, 69, 70]) aim to mitigate
injection attacks at runtime. However, none of them are widely adopted at present due to
high performance overheads.
Static analysis tools (e.g., [71, 72, 73]) are also not widely adopted due to high false
positives [74]. These false positives result, for example, from imprecision in the informationflow analyses used to determine how untrusted inputs get concatenated into SQL-statement
outputs.
Input sanitation is a more common technique for mitigating SQLIAs. Input sanitation
may entail whitelisting valid inputs, blacklisting invalid inputs, or escaping special characters [75]. All of these techniques have well-documented drawbacks, including:
• Whitelists and blacklists may introduce nontrivial complexities into application code.
For example, creating a new database table may require dynamically changing a
whitelist or blacklist of valid table names usable within SQL statements. In addition, incorrect or delayed dynamic updates to whitelists or blacklists may introduce
false negatives or positives [76, 77].
• When escaping special characters, some unexpectedly encoded characters may not be
properly recognized and escaped, creating false negatives [78]. Examples include SQL
smuggling [79], character homoglyph injection [80], and string literal injection without
quotes [81].
• Escaping special characters may also introduce SQLIA vulnerabilities. For example,
escaping single quotes in input strings (e.g., converting \';[code]-- to \'';[code]--)
may cause an application to output the SQLIA-exhibiting statement DELETE FROM
table WHERE name='\'';[code]--' [78].
12

String sql = "SELECT address FROM Customer WHERE password = ?";
PreparedStatement stmt = conn.prepareStatement(sql);
stmt.setString(1, userInput);
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();
Figure 2.1: A Java program using prepared statements.

• Applications may be vulnerable to second-order injection attacks when a sanitized
input is stored in a database and the stored input is reused without sanitation [81].
Due to these drawbacks, prepared statements are the standard defense against SQLIAs [77].
There have been efforts to build automatic prepared-statement-generation tools [82, 83,
84]. These tools analyze source code and convert concatenated SQL-statements to prepared
statements. Although some of the SQLIAs are prevented, none of these tools can prevent
SQL-IDIAs due to the fact that prepared statements cannot fill placeholders with identifiers.
Utilizing the proposed extended prepared-statement API can enable these tools to prevent
SQL-IDIAs.

2.2.2

Prepared Statements

Prepared statements, also known as parameterized queries, are the de facto mechanism
to prevent SQLIAs [75]. Figure 2.1 presents a program that employs prepared statements to
perform database operations. At a high-level, preventing SQLIAs with prepared statements
involves three main steps. First, an application creates a SQL-statement that has placeholders (i.e., the question mark symbol in the SQL statement) for literals and sends this
statement to a database system. Then, when the prepare-statement function is executed,
the database parses the statement and creates a statement structure having placeholders.
Next, the application fills these placeholders (e.g., by calling the setString function) with
values. This mechanism enforces that applications fill placeholders with literals, thus preventing SQLIAs.
13

A major limitation of prepared statements is that only application-level values are allowed
to replace placeholders [77]. For example, for applications written in Java, placeholders in
prepared statements may only be replaced by Java values such as string literals, integer
literals, and Java objects.
This limitation to replace prepared-statement placeholders with only application-level
values prevents safe construction of SQL statements having dynamically resolved identifiers [85, 86]. That is, standard libraries do not allow SQL identifiers such as table and
column names to replace placeholders in prepared statements. SQL syntax allows identifiers
to appear in many statements and clauses, including create, alter, and drop statements
and order by and group by clauses.
Because standard libraries do not allow SQL identifiers to replace placeholders in prepared statements, developers must concatenate dynamically resolved identifiers into SQL
statements, though such concatenations create SQL-IDIA vulnerabilities, like the one shown
in Figure 5.1. In fact, prior work showed that every concatenation of untrusted input into a
SQL statement can produce a SQLIA [15, 14].
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CHAPTER 3
COAUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS

This chapter

1

introduces the coauthentication systems. The devices involved in coau-

thentication are the authenticator (e.g., a server deciding whether to authenticate a user),
the requestor (on which the current authentication attempt is initiated), and one or more collaborators. The requestor and collaborator(s) are registered with the authenticator, meaning
that the devices have access to a secret that the authenticator can use to verify the devices’
participation in an authentication. This secret accessible to the requestor and collaborator(s)
may, for example, be a secret key shared with the authenticator, or a private key K such
that the authenticator can verify signatures created with K.
In some coauthentication protocols, the authenticator, upon receiving an authentication
request, issues one or more challenges and awaits one or more valid responses to the challenges.
Other protocols avoid authentication challenges. In all cases, the authenticator verifies that
multiple registered devices, more specifically the secret keys accessible to those devices,
participate in the authentication.

3.1

Attack Models and Assumptions
Coauthentication, like multi-factor techniques, protects against theft of any one authen-

tication secret. The secrets in coauthentication are cryptographic keys. Theft of coauthenti1

Parts of this chapter is published in ACM Symposium on Applied Computing [4]. Permission to use the
material is provided in Appendix A.
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cation secrets may occur in any way, including by remotely compromising devices to obtain
their stored keys or physically stealing devices.
Attackers are assumed to be active and can eavesdrop on, insert, delete, and modify
communications. Attackers may mount replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Attackers are however assumed to be incapable of cryptanalysis; attackers can only infer
plaintexts from ciphertexts when also having the required secret key. Without such an
assumption, attackers could extract credentials like session keys simply by monitoring and
cryptanalyzing legitimate authentications.
Some coauthentication protocols protect against attackers who know all the secrets stored
on a device that the victim user possesses. We call such attacks key-duplication attacks. For
example, an attacker may duplicate a device’s secret keys by remotely compromising the
device. Alternatively, the attacker may physically steal a device, duplicate all keys accessible
to the device, and return the device to the victim user, who may be unaware of the theft
and duplication.
To protect against key-duplication attacks, the coauthentication protocols assume that a
private communication channel, inaccessible to attackers, exists between the requestor and
collaborator devices. Such an assumption is necessary because the duplicated keys must be
updated through some channel inaccessible to the attacker; otherwise, the attacker—who has
all of the victim device D’s keys—could decrypt and obtain any updated keys sent to D, and
modify any updated keys sent from D. Private channels may be implemented with shortrange communications, such as NFC, zigbee, wireless USB, infrared, or near-field magnetic
induction, under the assumption that attackers cannot access such communications because
they are on direct, device-to-device channels.
Other coauthentication protocols do not require a private channel between requestor
and collaborator devices. Although these protocols do not protect against key-duplication
attacks, they do protect against attackers who obtain keys by stealing devices (without
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duplicating the keys in, and returning, the devices). In other words, the attack model for
these all-public-channel protocols assumes that if an attacker has obtained a device D’s
authentication secret, then D’s legitimate user no longer possesses D.
All of this dissertation’s coauthentication protocols assume that devices in the user’s
possession run as intended during the coauthentication process. Without such an assumption, malware on the user’s requestor device could simply leak decrypted session keys or any
other unencrypted private data, and malware on the user’s collaborator device could simply
approve an attacker’s authentication requests. Protecting against malware that is actively
running on a device in the user’s possession, while the user is authenticating, is beyond the
scope of coauthentication.
All of this paper’s coauthentication protocols also assume that authenticators run as
intended during the coauthentication process. Without such an assumption, malware on
the authenticator could simply leak secrets or allow all authentication requests. Protecting
against malware on authenticators is beyond the scope of coauthentication.

3.2

Collaboration Policies
Each collaborator may enforce its own policy defining the circumstances under which it

participates in a coauthentication.
For example, a collaborator may only participate in an authentication after a user has
clicked a button or provided some other input to confirm participation. Under this policy,
if an attacker steals or compromises the requestor and initiates a coauthentication, the
legitimate user will not confirm the attacker-initiated authentication on the collaborator, so
the authentication attempt will fail.
Alternatively, a collaborator may automatically participate in an authentication but warn
the user, or log, that it has done so, for example by displaying a text alert with an audible
warning sound (e.g., a text message). The alert could provide a simple interface for the user
17

to notify the authenticator if the collaboration was unauthorized (i.e., an attacker-initiated
authentication).
The first of these example policies, which we call the disallow-by-default collaboration
policy, only collaborates when a user confirms the authentication. The second policy, which
we call the allow-by-default-with-warning collaboration policy, relies on users to observe a
warning and handle unauthorized collaborations after the fact.
These two policies illustrate a security-usability tradeoff: the disallow-by-default policy
prevents attackers from initiating authentications (increased security) but requires user confirmation on each authentication (decreased usability). The allow-by-default-with-warning
policy allows attackers to successfully be logged in during the window of time between when
the collaborator warns the user and when the user observes the warning and notifies the
authenticator of the unauthorized authentication (decreased security), but users don’t have
to confirm the authentications on the collaborator (increased usability).
For many applications the usability benefits of the allow-by-default-with-warning policy
may outweigh the security costs; many modern authentication systems email or text users
after suspicious logins and request after-the-fact notification of unauthorized access. For
example, users of financial servers may prioritize usability because (1) authorized logins are
far more common than unauthorized logins, and (2) the financial institutions, due to legal
requirements or to entice customers, may guarantee to reimburse customers for any losses
incurred from unauthorized logins.
Additional collaboration policies are possible. For example, a collaborator could decide
whether to participate in a coauthentication based on the requestor’s proximity, that is,
whether the requesting device is co-located with the collaborator. In applications where
the attack vector of concern is device theft, a collaborator may presume that a co-located
requestor has not been stolen. Such a collaborator may tacitly allow collaborations with
co-located requestors but show warnings for, require explicit confirmations for, or disallow
18

Table 3.1: Example collaboration policies.
Description of the collaboration policy
Disallow by default (require user confirmation before collaborating)
Allow by default, with a warning or log of the collaboration
If co-located then tacitly allow, else allow by default with a warning
If co-located then tacitly allow, else disallow by default
If co-located then tacitly allow, else disallow entirely
If co-located then allow by default with a warning, else disallow by default
If co-located then allow by default with a warning, else disallow entirely
If co-located then disallow by default, else disallow entirely

entirely, collaborations with non-co-located requestors. Many methods exist for detecting or
enforcing co-location; a simple implementation might just require communication through a
short-range channel such as NFC, Bluetooth, or body area network [87, 88].
Table 3.1 lists several of these example collaboration policies. Many others are possible,
such as taking into account the source of authentication requests or how much time has
passed since earlier collaborations.

3.3

The Full Coauthentication Protocol
Figure 3.1 illustrates the full coauthentication protocol for two user devices. Authentica-

tion secrets in this protocol are shared symmetric-cryptography keys, and there is only one
collaborator. Secret key KAR (KAC ) is shared between authenticator and requestor (collaborator). Each Ni is a nonce, and {M }K is the encryption of M using key K. The third
message is sent through a private channel.
Following the flow of data in Figure 3.1, the full protocol operates as follows. Assume
that during device registration, the authenticator A and requestor R share a secret key KAR ,
and the authenticator A and collaborator C share a secret key KAC .
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Figure 3.1: The full coauthentication protocol.

1. Requestor R initiates the coauthentication by sending the authenticator A its ID and
an encrypted authentication-request message containing a challenge nonce N1 (which
serves to authenticate A to R).
2. Authenticator A receives and decrypts the request message, finds that the requestor
R is registered to a user having collaborating device C, creates a challenge nonce N2
d
d
d
(which serves to authenticate R to A), generates two new keys (K
AR and KAR ) to

share with R (to rotate keys, to ensure forward secrecy and prevent key-duplication
attacks), and double encrypts these data in a collaboration-request message to C,
the first (inner) encryption using KAR and the second (outer) encryption using KAC .
By double encrypting nonce N2 , the authenticator ensures participation of both user
devices’ secret keys (KAR and KAC ) in the coauthentication.
3. Collaborator C receives and decrypts the previous message, verifies the identity of the

requestor, and forwards the decrypted message (which is still ciphertext encrypted with
KAR ) to requestor R through a private channel.
4. Requestor R receives and decrypts this message using KAR , verifies the identity of the
d
d
d
collaborator, and obtains N2 , K
AR , and KAR . The requestor then generates and sends
the authenticator a collaboration-response message containing N2 encrypted with its
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d
d
d
first updated key, K
AR . The requestor saves the second updated key, KAR , for a future
coauthentication request.

5. Authenticator A receives the collaboration-response message, decrypts, and verifies
the collaborator’s identity and that the received nonce matches the N2 it sent earlier.
Because A has now verified participation of both keys KAR and KAC , it sends an
authentication-complete message, for example containing a session key KSK , to the
requestor R.
6. Requestor R sends an acknowledgment to the authenticator.
Timestamps may be added to these messages, for example to implement timeouts or finegrained logging. Message Authentication Codes (MACs) may also be added to these messages
to provide data integrity.
Notice that full coauthentication stores three keys long term: KAR may be stored long
d
d
term before the current round of authentication, K
AR may be stored long term after the

current round of authentication, and KAC may be stored long term before and after the
current round of authentication.

3.3.1

Properties of the Full Protocol

The full coauthentication protocol uses nonces to authenticate the requestor and authenticator to each other—session keys are only shared between mutually authenticated devices.
Requestor R only shares session keys with authenticated As, and authenticator A only shares
session keys with authenticated Rs.
The full protocol also employs key rotation to ensure forward secrecy. An attacker who
acquires the keys stored long term on at most one user device cannot obtain past session
d
keys. Each session key KSK is encrypted with an updated K
AR .
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The full protocol mitigates man-in-the-middle attacks by making the authentication secrets shared between the authenticator and user devices be cryptographic keys, used to
encrypt communications. In contrast, man-in-the-middle attacks may be possible on password or biometrics systems because the authenticator may only share, with users or user
devices, secrets that are insufficient for cryptographic use. For example, a man-in-the-middle
attack on an OTP system may proceed as follows: the victim enters a username and password on a fake website; the fake website forwards this information to the real website, which
then issues an OTP; the victim receives and enters the OTP into the fake website; the attacker completes the authentication on the real website and masquerades as the user. In
this case the shared username/password (or hash thereof) is insufficient for providing the
cryptographic properties needed to mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks.
Now suppose an attacker acquires the long-term secrets stored on at most one user device.
Acquiring KAC only enables an attacker, even one with access to the private channel, to
permit or deny authentications initiated by the victim. Attackers are already assumed to be
active and consequently capable of denying service by dropping network messages. Acquiring
KAC therefore provides an attacker with no new capabilities (and Section 3.4 describes
extensions of coauthentication that mitigate denial-of-service attacks on user devices).
On the other hand, acquiring only the KAR to be used in the next coauthentication request
enables an attacker to request authentication, but assuming an appropriate collaboration
policy, the collaborator will notify the victim user of the authentication attempt. From the
victim’s perspective, this attacker-initiated authentication attempt will be unexpected, so
the victim will deny collaboration and therefore the authentication.
Acquiring only the KAR to be used in the next coauthentication request also enables an
attacker mounting a key-duplication attack to wait for and decrypt a legitimate authentication request coming from the requestor device, still in the victim’s possession. However, such
an attacker only obtains nonce N1 in the process and cannot decrypt any of the remaining
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Figure 3.2: A coauthentication protocol omitting authenticator challenges.

messages in the protocol, because they are either encrypted with different keys or sent on a
private channel. Obtaining KAR and N1 provides an attacker with no new capabilities.
The full coauthentication protocol therefore protects against attackers who have acquired
the long-term secrets stored on at most one user device. ProVerif has been used to formalize
and verify these arguments, as described in Chapter 4.

3.3.2

Variation: Omitting the Challenge-Response

It is possible to avoid the challenge-response portion of the full coauthentication protocol,
implemented with nonce N2 , by having the requestor send two requests, one to the authenticator (to request authentication) and another to the collaborator (to request collaboration).
Figure 3.2 shows such a challengeless protocol. The second message is sent through a
private channel. The requestor sends two requests, one to the authenticator and another to
the collaborator, containing the same nonce N1 . The requestor also includes the updated
versions of KAR in its collaboration-request message, which the collaborator forwards to the
authenticator. These updated keys are double encrypted during transit from the collaborator
to the authenticator, protecting the keys against attackers having obtained at most one of
KAR and KAC . After verifying that both the requestor and its registered collaborator have
participated in an authentication by sending the same N1 , the authenticator sends a new
session key to the requestor, encrypted with the proper updated version of KAR . As in the
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Figure 3.3: A challengeless coauthentication incorporating message forwarding.

full protocol, this challengeless version results in the authenticator and requestor sharing an
d
d
updated K
AR , usable in a subsequent run of the protocol as the new version of KAR .
Having formally verified both the full and challengeless coauthentication protocols, to

our knowledge they provide the same security guarantees. The known tradeoffs between
these protocols relate to performance. The challengeless protocol is expected to be more
efficient overall, due to the omission of challenge creation and the parallelization or batching
of some of the communications (e.g., the first and second messages in Figure 3.2). However,
the computations performed by individual devices may be more efficient in the full version.
For example, from the requestor’s perspective, the challengeless protocol essentially replaces
the computations needed to decrypt the third message and generate the fourth message
of Figure 3.1 with the computations needed to generate the second message of Figure 3.2,
including generating updated versions of KAR . For some user devices, such as IoT devices
with limited resources, some of these computations may be more expensive than others,
making one protocol more efficient than another for those devices.

3.3.3

Variation: Incorporating Message Forwarding

Figure 3.3 shows a variation of the challengeless protocol that incorporates message forwarding. The first message is sent through a private channel. The protocol shown in Figure 3.3 is the same as the one shown in Figure 3.2 but with the collaborator forwarding the
authentication-request message to the authenticator on behalf of the requestor. The protocol
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Figure 3.4: An all-public-channel variation of the full coauthentication (Figure 3.1).

of Figure 3.3 is of particular interest because it achieves the minimal number of messages
needed to coauthenticate. Ignoring the final acknowledgment, successful coauthentication
requires at least three messages because both the requestor and collaborator must demonstrate participation to the authenticator, and the authenticator must respond with a new
session key or other post-authentication capability.

3.3.4

Variation: No Private Channels

In cases where a private channel does not exist between the requestor and collaborator,
coauthentication protocols cannot prevent key-duplication attacks. The ability of an attacker, who has acquired all the secrets stored on a user-possessed requestor R, to eavesdrop
on and modify all communications to and from R, makes it impossible to update R’s secrets
without the attacker also obtaining any updates sent to R and modifying any updates sent
from R.
In practice it may be acceptable to dismiss key-duplication attacks by relying on alternative mechanisms to mitigate them. For example, a device’s long-term, rarely updated key
KAR may be stored in a trusted platform module (TPM) [89]. With KAR in a TPM, we
might assume that attackers, who possibly have physical access to the requestor R, may be
able to use KAR to initiate authentications on R, but cannot extract KAR from R. That
is, mechanisms like TPMs may mitigate key-duplication attacks by allowing authentication
secrets to be used but not extracted, and therefore not duplicated.
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Figure 3.5: All-public variation of the challengeless coauthentication (Figure 3.2).

It may also be acceptable to dismiss key-duplication attacks in cases where the threat is
considered remote or private channels simply cannot be implemented or would be costly to
implement.
In any of these cases, the coauthentication protocols can be varied to no longer require
a private channel between the requestor and collaborator, yet still protect against non-keyduplication attacks. The attack model for these all-public-channel protocols assumes that
if an attacker has obtained a device D’s authentication secret, then D’s legitimate user no
longer possesses D. This attack model still covers attacks based on stealing devices and
attempting to authenticate on the stolen devices.
All-public-channel variations exist for all the protocols shown in Figures 3.1–3.3.
Figures 3.4–3.6 show all-public-channel variations of Figures 3.1–3.3. These all-publicchannel protocols match the private-channel protocols, except they abandon all messages
and data whose purpose was to update keys (such as the third message in Figure 3.1) and
encrypt all messages sent between the requestor and collaborator with a shared key KRC .
The all-public-channel protocols are simpler, and expected to run more efficiently, than
the private-channel protocols but do not protect against key-duplication attacks and do not
satisfy forward secrecy.
In practice a hybrid approach may be preferred: coauthentication keys may be updated
only periodically, using private channels at opportune times, while public-channel protocols
are used in the common case.
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To make an analogy with password-based authentication systems, ideally—from a security perspective—users would update their passwords on every authentication, to limit
attackers who have acquired passwords. Doing so would be like using the private-channel
protocols for coauthentication. In practice, however, tradeoffs are made, and passwords are
typically updated only rarely [59].

3.3.5

Variation: Asymmetric Cryptography

Asymmetric (public-key) operations may replace the symmetric-cryptographic operations
in coauthentication protocols.
For example, Figure 3.7 shows a public-key version of the all-public-channel protocol
shown in Figure 3.4. The encryption of M using the requestor’s public key is notated {M }R ,
and {M }R−1 refers to R’s digital signature of M (and similarly for authenticator A and
collaborator C). Converting from all-public-channel protocols based on symmetric cryptography (such as are shown in Figures 3.4–3.6) to ones based on asymmetric cryptography
requires only standard techniques (encryptions in the symmetric version based on shared
keys are replaced by encryptions in the asymmetric version based on the recipient’s public
key, digital signatures are added to messages, etc).
Converting from private-channel protocols based on symmetric cryptography (such as are
shown in Figures 3.1–3.3), to ones based on asymmetric cryptography requires additional
techniques. In these cases, where defense against key-duplication attacks and forward secrecy
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Figure 3.7: A public-key variation of the protocol in Figure 3.4.

need to be provided, the requestor’s (public, private) key pair must be updated on every
authentication.
Updates to the requestor’s (public, private) keys may occur in various ways. A basic
design would have the authenticator provide two new key pairs to the requestor in the same
ways that the symmetric designs (e.g., Figure 3.1) have the authenticator provide two new
shared keys to the requestor. However, having the authenticator generate private keys for the
requestor, even private keys only used for the authenticator’s services, may not be considered
appropriate for asymmetric systems. Less practically, the requestor could update its keys in
the public-key infrastructure before or during every authentication.

3.3.6

Variation: Three Device Coauthentication

A variety of coauthentication protocols exist for cases in which a user has registered
more than two devices with an authenticator. When coauthenticating, such a user may have
multiple possible collaborator devices. The authenticator in such a case may determine some
subset of the registered user devices to which to send challenges, possibly based on guidance
from the requestor. The authenticator may then send one or more challenges to this subset
of devices, such that the challenges cryptographically require participation from some or all
of the user devices.
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Figure 3.8: A three device variation of the protocol in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.8 shows such a coauthentication protocol that uses two collaborators. The
authenticator sends two collaboration requests, one to the first registered collaborator C1
and another to the second registered collaborator C2 . Notice that the authenticator includes
updated versions of KAR in its collaboration-request messages. Once the requestor obtains
two collaboration messages from the collaborators, it sends a collaboration-response message
that is encrypted with the combination of updated keys obtained from the two collaboration
messages. This three-device version of coauthentication results in the authenticator and
d
d
d
d
d
d
requestor sharing an updated KAR and K
AR combination, usable in a subsequent run of the

protocol as the new version of KAR .

This three-device variation of coauthentication protects against the compromise of two
user devices. Compromising two of the user’s devices is not sufficient for authenticating as
that user, because an attacker still needs an extra device for coauthentication.
Formal verification of protocols for 3 and 4 device coauthentication is presented in Section 4.1, and further generalizations to multi-device coauthentication are discussed in Section 3.4.5.
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3.4

Applications of Coauthentication
Besides the more-obvious applications of authentication, such as logging in to operating

systems and web services, authentication occurs in less-obvious, but common, ways, including
pushing a button on a remote control to open a door or gate, using a physical key to unlock
a door or start an engine, or swiping, scanning, or inserting a payment card, passport, or
driver’s license.
A thief who successfully breaks into a car containing a garage-door or gate controller
can push a button to open the victim’s garage or gate. Such attacks have occurred [90, 91].
With coauthentication, a garage-door or gate controller may require both the requestor (a
car or a remote control in the car) and a collaborator (a smartphone) to participate in the
authentication required for opening. Then an attacker stealing only the victim’s car, or only
the victim’s smartphone, cannot open the door or gate. This benefit is nontrivial due to
the heterogeneity of the required user devices (car and phone): people rarely leave phones in
cars unattended, so a successful attack on, or theft of, one of the two user devices does not
normally provide all the secrets required for coauthentication.
Door locks are a similar application. Here the requestor may be a radio transmitter, for
example on smart apparel, that sends requests to all locks (authenticators) located within
1m, and the collaborator may be a smartphone. The collaboration policy might require
that the phone tacitly allows collaborations for co-located requestors and disallows, with
warnings, all other collaborations. Such a system mitigates the recent relay attacks on car
doors [92].
Payment cards might also be coauthenticated, to require participation of a registered
smartphone as a collaborator to the requesting payment card (which itself might be combined into an existing device, such as a smartwatch). This coauthenticated payment system
would achieve security protections similar to systems in which an OTP, sent to the user’s
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phone, is required for payment-card use; however, the coauthentication system could run
automatically, without requiring the user to enter any passwords, for example with the
smartphone enforcing the second-to-last collaboration policy listed in Table 3.1.
When run automatically, without requiring user interaction, coauthentication is a zerointeraction authentication system [66]. By making authentications transparent and unobtrusive, zero-interaction systems enable more devices to benefit from authentication, without
fatiguing users with authentication activities. These benefits include enforcing access controls and adjusting to the preferences of each registered user. For example, smart home
assistants, smart appliances, and computer components (microphones, keyboards, cameras,
memory modules, ALUs) may coauthenticate users to mitigate unauthorized use; televisions
may coauthenticate users to enforce parental controls; and chairs, lights, HVAC systems,
etc., may coauthenticate users to adjust to their personal preferences.
For this same reason of coauthentication being able to run transparently, or with limited
user interaction such as clicking a confirmation button, coauthentication is well suited to
continuous authentication [66, 93]. Because continuous authentication requires reauthenticating users periodically, only zero- and low-interaction techniques are appropriate for this
application.
Coauthentication may also provide accessibility benefits over existing authentication
methods. For example, typing a password can be challenging for visually impaired users
on mobile devices [94]. Using the existing accessibility features of mobile devices such as
voice recognition and large text fonts may leak sensitive password information to attackers
via shoulder surfing [43, 53] or auditory surveillance [95]. Visually impaired users may benefit form coauthentication; users may click a large button to coauthenticate, and then the
coauthentication system could run automatically, without requiring the users to enter any
passwords.
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Extensions and generalizations of coauthentication are possible. Unlike the variations
presented in Sections 3.3.2–3.3.4, this extensions presented in the following subsections are
not tied to the details of the full protocol.

3.4.1

Additional Challenges and Responses

The full coauthentication protocol uses a challenge-response process in which the authenticator first encrypts a nonce to challenge the requestor R and then encrypts the result to
challenge the collaborator C. Receiving a valid response requires participation from, and
collaboration between, both R and C.
Many other challenge-response processes are possible. For example, the authenticator
may reverse the order of encryptions to require the requestor to participate before the collaborator; the authenticator may only encrypt the challenge with one shared key (e.g., KAR )
and wait for a valid response encrypted with the other shared key (e.g., KAC ); the authenticator may concurrently send the requestor and collaborator the same or different challenges
and require valid responses from both; or the authenticator may issue challenges for which
generating valid responses requires interacting with one or more third-party servers. Authenticators may issue challenges requiring other sorts of responses as well, such as requiring
message authentication codes (MACs) or passwords or other secrets in responses.

3.4.2

Locally Broadcasting Challenges

In some applications it may be useful to make some of the coauthentication protocol’s
communications multicast or broadcast. For example, to require additional user interaction
during coauthentication, the requesting device may receive a challenge directly from the
authenticator and then display (visually/locally broadcast) the challenge as a QR code [96].
The user could then scan the challenge QR code on the collaborating device, which could
then send a valid response to the authenticator.
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3.4.3

Collaboration to Obtain Session Keys

Similar to the double encryption for transmitting challenges in the full coauthentication protocol, authenticators may double encrypt authentication-complete (e.g., session-key)
d
messages. Encrypting session-key messages with both KAC and KAR (or K
AR ) forces both

the requestor and collaborator to participate, to obtain the session key. Requiring this additional collaboration mitigates attacks in which the requestor is noticeably compromised
after the collaborator responds to the authentication challenge, giving the collaborator one
more chance to confirm the authentication before the requestor obtains the session key.

3.4.4

Authenticating Other Devices

The coauthentication protocols may also be modified to give the collaborator access to
the session key. For example, coauthentication may proceed as normal before the requestor
shares the session key with the collaborator, possibly after a mutual authentication between
requestor and collaborator. Another example involves a device, pre-authenticated with the
requestor, using the requestor as a proxy to authenticate to the authenticator, building a
chain of authentication. Such designs enable n-way authentication, or mutual authentication
between multiple pairs of devices.

3.4.5

Multiple Collaborators, m-out-of-n Policies, and Availability Benefits

There are advantages to systems in which users register more than two devices with an
authenticator. Suppose a user has registered n devices and the authenticator requires any
m of the n devices to coauthenticate, where 2 ≤ m ≤ n. In the coauthentication protocols
described so far, m=n=2, but now suppose m=2 and n=3. In this case, compromising
only one of the user’s devices (i.e., obtaining only one device’s authentication secrets) is still
insufficient for authenticating as that user, because m=2. At the same time, because m<n,
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the user can be authenticated even after forgetting or losing a device, or having a device
become inoperable, for example due to a denial-of-service attack.
This m-out-of-n-device policy, enforced at the authenticator, tolerates the absence of
n−m devices. Hence, user-side denial-of-service attacks require denying service to n−m+1
devices. When these devices communicate through heterogeneous channels, denial-of-service
attacks based on jamming or otherwise interfering with specific communication channels
become more difficult to mount.
To prevent attackers from using n−m compromised devices to coauthenticate, m may
be further constrained to be greater than n−m, that is, m > n/2. For example, a system
that requires only 2 out of 4 devices to coauthenticate (i.e., m=2=n/2) tolerates the absence
of 2 devices, but if those 2 devices are absent due to theft, then the thief can use them to
coauthenticate. To prevent such attacks, the m-out-of-n-device policy may be constrained
to 2 ≤ m ≤ n < 2m
The m-out-of-n-device policy can be generalized further, to policies in which devices
are, for example, (1) weighted in various ways to get above a threshold (e.g., 2 “votes” are
required to authenticate the current user, but each smart shoe only gets half a vote), (2) required (e.g., 2 devices are required but one must be the user’s smartphone), or (3) excluded
(e.g., high-risk users may not use easily-transferrable smartcards for coauthentication).

3.4.6

Group Coauthentication

Users may also be coauthenticated simultaneously, as a group. Such authentication
subsumes the famous two-person concept for authenticating users who will have access to
nuclear and other weapons [97, 98], or to bank vaults. For example, a two-person policy
may require two users to simultaneously turn four keys, one in each hand, to gain access
to a weapon-deployment system. The goal is to require both users to participate in the
authentication.
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Because coauthentication requires participation of multiple devices in an authentication,
it may require participation of multiple users in an authentication, where each user has at
least one registered device. The same coauthentication protocols can be followed to authenticate multiple users’ devices simultaneously. More sophisticated group coauthentications
could, for example, require participation of m-out-of-n devices from each of j-out-of-k users.
Group coauthentication may also be used to implement parental control applications.
For example, a learners-permit holding child can only run a car when his smartphone and
his parent’s registered smartwatch participate in the coauthentication. On the other hand,
the parent can run the car by using his own devices. As another example, a smart TV
can only display certain TV channels when the parent’s smartwatch is participating in the
coauthentication.

3.4.7

Device Sharing and Anonymous Coauthentication

Users may also share devices. For example, a garage-door authenticator may receive a
request from a shared family car and send challenges to all the smartphones of drivers in
the family, or only those smartphones in near-proximity. The smartphones might enforce
the collaboration policy of tacitly participating if co-located with the requestor and not
participating otherwise.
Alternatively, assume that every collaborator (smartphone) shares the same secret key
with the garage-door authenticator. Then the authenticator may, upon receiving a request
from the family car, respond directly to the car with a challenge requiring participation
from any collaborator—and leave it to the car to obtain a collaborator’s participation. An
interesting aspect of this alternative is the anonymity it provides: the authenticator only
communicates with the shared requestor device and does not know which user has been
authenticated, nor which device has collaborated. Authentications are still protected against
attackers acquiring one of the secret keys.
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It is also possible to achieve anonymous coauthentication for systems in which requestor
devices are not shared, by having all potential requestors share the same secret key with
the authenticator. Because coauthenticators verify usage of keys, anonymity is achieved by
having devices share keys.
Of course, these designs only protect anonymity during the authentication process. Authenticators frequently have other opportunities to de-anonymize users, though techniques
like onion routing [99] may mitigate some de-anonymizations.

3.4.8

Post-Quantum Coauthentication

Many existing authentication methods rely on public-key cryptography to transfer messages over the public network. However, public-key methods such as RSA and ECC can
be compromised using Shor’s algorithm when a large-scale quantum powered computer becomes available [100]. Furthermore, a powerful enough quantum computer can crack hashed
passwords effectively [101]. Therefore, password authentication and other authentication
methods relying on public key cryptography may became ineffective against quantum computers.
As far as we are aware, existing symmetric key algorithms (e.g., AES-256) will remain
resistant against a powerful quantum computer [102]. Therefore, symmetric-key coauthentication protocols illustrated in Figures 3.1– 3.6 can be resistant to a powerful post-quantum
adversary.
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CHAPTER 4
FORMAL AND EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF COAUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOLS

This chapter

4.1

1

presents an empirical and formal analysis of coauthentication protocols.

Formal Evaluation
The principal security properties of the example coauthentication protocols shown in

Figures 3.1–3.7, and several multi-device coauthentication protocols such as the one shown
in Figure 3.8, have been formally verified with ProVerif [8, 9]. ProVerif uses a resolutionbased strategy to verify that protocols satisfy desired security properties. A benefit of using
ProVerif is that it can model arbitrarily many sessions of a protocol running concurrently.

4.1.1

Protocol Modeling

The protocol encodings faithfully follow the communications shown in Figures 3.1–3.8.
To model key updates in the private-channel protocols (Figures 3.1–3.3) we used key tables [103, p.37]. These key tables are only accessible to the legitimate actors (i.e., Requestor,
Authenticator, and Collaborator) of the protocol. The protocols dynamically generate new
d
d
d
keys (i.e., K
AR and KAR ) during an authentication session, and at the end of the session,
d
d
the new long-term key (K
AR ) gets inserted into the key table.
1
Parts of this chapter is published in ACM Symposium on Applied Computing [4]. Permission to use the
material is provided in Appendix A.
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Another way to model key updates is to use a global state in the protocol encoding.
However, ProVerif cannot model global states in protocols. StatVerif is an extension to
ProVerif that enables modeling of global states in protocol models [104]. We also modeled
key updates in the private-channel protocols (Figures 3.1–3.3) using StatVerif. In this model,
instead of using a key table, we used a global variable to store the secret key, and at the
end of an authentication session, we updated the global variable with the new key. In both
coauthentication models—using key tables and global states—we verified the same properties
and obtained the same results.
To generalize coauthentication protocols, we modeled the three-device protocol shown
in Figure 3.8 as an m-out-of-n protocol, where m is the number of participating devices
(in this case m = 3), and n is the total number of devices. To model such a protocol,
we created a new process in the encoding that registers arbitrarily many user devices. In
the model, 3-out-of-n devices need to participate in a coauthentication session. To ensure
that coauthentication mitigates compromise of m − 1 devices, we gave 2 user devices (i.e.,
the secrets stored on 2 user devices) to attackers. To make sure that all coauthentication
versions mitigate compromise of m − 1 devices, we also modeled and verified the 4-out-of-n
coauthentication version in the same way that we modeled the three-device version shown
in Figure 3.8.
Each protocol session of 2-device coauthentication protocols (Figures 3.1–3.7) runs 3
processes (authenticator A, requestor R, and collaborator C), and the main ProVerif process
considers arbitrarily many sessions of a protocol running concurrently. The m-out-of-n
protocols have (1) additional processes for each collaborators, and (2) an additional keygeneration process for registering arbitrarily many devices. For example, the 3-out-of-n
protocol runs 5 processes (authenticator A, requestor R, collaborator1 C1 , collaborator2 C2 ,
and a key-generation process).
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Our ProVerif encodings of the coauthentication protocols (including the stateful versions),
and the properties verified, are available online [105].

4.1.2

Assumptions

The protocols were modeled and verified under the assumptions stated in Section 3.1.
The private-channel protocols (Figures 3.1–3.3 and m-out-of-n protocols) have strong attack
models allowing key-duplication attacks.
The all-public-channel protocols (Figures 3.4–3.7) have a weaker attack model that assumes authentication secrets (KAR , KAC , and KRC ) are only accessible to attackers through
device theft. In terms of the ProVerif encodings, this weaker attack model means that,
in cases where attackers are assumed to know KAR , the collaborator does not respond to
collaboration requests. The justification is that if an attacker has acquired KAR , then by
assumption the legitimate user does not possess the requestor, so collaboration requests must
be for unauthorized, attacker-initiated authentications. It is assumed that, with appropriate
collaboration policies, users do not approve collaborations for unauthorized authentications.
In all the protocols, attackers are active and may freely eavesdrop on, insert, delete, and
modify communications. Attackers are not constrained to operate according to any of the
protocols.

4.1.3

Verification Setup

Each protocol was verified in 3 runs; as shown in Table 4.1.
1. The first run began with attackers knowing no secret keys.
2. The second run began with attackers knowing all the long-term keys accessible to the
collaborator. For the protocols shown in Figures 3.1–3.4, attackers were given KAC ;
for the protocols shown in Figures 3.5–3.6, attackers were given KAC and KRC ; for
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Table 4.1: Verification setup of each protocol in three different runs.

Protocol

Run 1

Attackers’ Knowledge
Run 2
Run 3
d
d
KAR and K
AR

Figure 3.1

No secrets

KAC

Figure 3.2

No secrets

KAC

Figure 3.3

No secrets

KAC

d
d
KAR and K
AR

Figure 3.4

No secrets

KAC

d
d
KAR and K
AR
KAR

Figure 3.5

No secrets

KAC and KRC

KAR and KRC

Figure 3.6

No secrets

KAC and KRC

KAR and KRC

Figure 3.7

No secrets

C −1

R−1

3-out-of-n

4-out-of-n

No secrets

No secrets

All KAC s

All KAC s

d
d
KAR , K
AR ,

d
d
d
d
K
AR , and KAC

d
d
d
d
d
d
KAR ,K
,
K
AR
AR ,

d
d
d
d
d
d
K
AR ,and 2 KAC s

the protocol shown in Figure 3.7, attackers were given C −1 ; and for the m-out-of-n
protocols, attackers were given all the collaborator keys that are generated by the
key-generation process.
3. The third run began with attackers knowing all the long-term keys accessible to the
requestor in the protocols shown in Figures 3.1– 3.7. For the protocols shown in Figd
d
ures 3.1–3.3, attackers were given KAR and K
AR ; for the protocols shown in Figures 3.5–

3.6, attackers were given KAR and KRC ; and for the protocol shown in Figure 3.7,
attackers were given R−1 . In the third run of the m-out-of-n protocols, attackers were
given all the long-term keys stored on m − 1 devices: for the 3-out-of-n protocol, at40

tackers were given the requestor’s long-term keys and one other collaborator’s key; and
for the 4-out-of-n protocol, attackers were given the requestor’s long-term keys and two
other collaborators’ keys.
In all 3 runs of each of the protocols, we attempted to verify the following security
properties.

4.1.3.1

P1: Secrecy of the Session Key

The session key KSK is only known to the authenticator and requestor. This property
subsumes forward secrecy of session keys (KSK ) in the third run of the private-channel
protocols (Figures 3.1–3.3) because knowing the requestor’s future authentication secret
d
d
(K
AR , which becomes KAR in the next round of authentication) does not leak session keys.
4.1.3.2

P2: Authentication of R to A

With one exception, we specified authentication of R to A as requiring that if the authenticator receives an acknowledgment of a session key (and therefore believes it shares
the session key with the requestor) then the requestor was indeed its interlocutor and the
collaborator indeed collaborated. This is an event-based property [106] having the form

endA =⇒ (beginA ∧ collabA),
where endA refers to the event of A receiving the acknowledgment, beginA to R sending
the authentication request, and collabA to C sending its participation message (in the third
message of Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 and the second message of Figures 3.3 and 3.6).
For the m-out-of-n protocols, each collaborator has its own collabA event corresponding to
its participation message. For example, the event-based property has the following form for
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the 3-out-of-n protocol:

endA =⇒ (beginA ∧ collabA1 ∧ collabA2 ).
The one exception to encoding P2 in this way is for the second run of the all-publicchannel protocols (Figures 3.4– 3.7), where the attacker is given either KAC , or KAC and
KRC . In this case, the attacker may use KRC to obtain, and/or KAC to collaborate with,
legitimate authentication requests, thus helping legitimate authentications succeed, which
we do not consider an attack. Therefore, for the second run of the Figures 3.4– 3.7 protocols,
we specify property P2 as only requiring

endA =⇒ beginA,

that is, if the authenticator believes it shares the session key with the requestor then the
requestor was indeed its interlocutor (but the attacker, rather than the collaborator, may
have collaborated).

4.1.3.3

P3: Authentication of A to R

This property is symmetric to P2 and, with one exception, requires that if the requestor
sends an acknowledgment of a session key (and therefore believes it shares the session key with
the authenticator) then the authenticator was indeed its interlocutor and the collaborator
indeed collaborated. This property has the form

endR =⇒ (beginR ∧ collabR),
where endR refers to R sending the acknowledgment, beginR to A receiving the authentication request, and collabR to C sending its participation message. Similarly to P2, each
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Table 4.2: Formal verification results.
Protocol
Figure 3.1
Figure 3.2
Figure 3.3
Figure 3.4
Figure 3.5
Figure 3.6
Figure 3.7
3-out-of-n
4-out-of-n

P1: Secrecy of the KSK
Run 1
Run 2
Run 3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

P2: Authentication of R to A
Run 1
Run 2
Run 3
3
3
3
[
[
[
[
[
[
3
3
3
[
3
3
[
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

P3: Authentication of A to R
Run 1
Run 2
Run 3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

collaborator in the m-out-of-n protocols has its own collabR event. For example, the eventbased property has the following form for the 3-out-of-n protocol:

endR =⇒ (beginR ∧ collabR1 ∧ collabR2 ).
As with P2, the one exception to encoding P3 in this way is for the second run of the
all-public-channel protocols (Figures 3.4– 3.7), in which case P3 only requires

endR =⇒ beginR,

for the same reason explained for property P2.

4.1.4

Verification Results

Table 4.2 shows the verification results. Cells with “3” denote ProVerif proved the
property. Cells with “[” denote ProVerif outputted “cannot be proved” for the property.
ProVerif found no attacks on any of properties P1–P3 in any runs of any of the protocols.
That is, ProVerif did not refute any of P1–P3 in any runs of any of the protocols.
ProVerif did prove P1 and P3 for all 3 runs of all 10 protocols, and it proved P2 for
all 3 runs of the full coauthentication protocol (Figure 3.1), the all-public channel variation
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of the full protocol (Figure 3.4), the asymmetric-key protocol (Figure 3.7), and all of the
m-out-of-n protocols. It also proved P2 for the second and third runs of the protocols shown
in Figure 3.5 and 3.6.
For all runs of the protocols shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, and for the first runs of
the protocols shown in Figure 3.5 and 3.6, ProVerif outputs that P2 “cannot be proved”. It
produces traces in which a man-in-the-middle sits between A and R, and A and C, and simply
collects and forwards all messages sent to and from A. This trace is not an attack because the
authenticator completes the protocols with R having sent the original authentication request
and C having sent its participation message, despite the fact that the attacker touched these
messages while acting as an intermediary.
We also note that these results are for the stronger, injective-correspondence versions of
properties P2 and P3. The injective-correspondence versions require there to be a unique
predecessor event for each end event [103, pp.19–22]; for example, the injective version of
P2 requires that for each endA event there exists a unique beginA predecessor event. The
non-injective versions allow end events to have non-unique predecessor events. ProVerif was
able to prove the weaker, non-injective version of property P2 for all runs of all protocols.

4.2

Empirical Evaluation
We have implemented and measured the performance of full coauthentication (Figure 3.1)

and the variations shown in Figures 3.2–3.7. To establish a baseline of performance, we also
implemented and measured the performance of a basic password authentication system. In
total, 8 authentication systems were evaluated.
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4.2.1

Implementations

The password-authentication system only uses two devices (requestor and authenticator),
while all of the coauthentication systems use three devices (authenticator, requestor, and
collaborator).
To make performance comparisons more meaningful, the implementations were uniform
to the extent possible. Each authenticator was implemented as a Java server application using Spring Boot [107], and each requestor and collaborator was implemented as an Android
application. All nonces were 64-bit strings dynamically generated with Java’s cryptographically strong random number generator class java.security.SecureRandom. All session
keys in authentication-complete messages were 256-bit strings dynamically generated in the
same way. The versions of coauthentication shown in Figures 3.1–3.3 also required two new
d
d
d
keys to be generated dynamically, K
AR and KAR , again with Java’s cryptographically strong
random number generator. All other cryptographic keys were hardcoded, with shared keys
assumed to have been shared before the implementations began running. All symmetric
cryptographic operations were implemented with 256-bit CBC-mode AES, and all asymmetric cryptographic operations were implemented with HTTPS using 2048-bit RSA and
self-signed certificates, through standard javax.crypto libraries.
To broadly mimic typical password-authentication systems, we implemented ours to run
over HTTPS (again, using 2048-bit RSA and self-signed certificates). The requestor in
our implementation sends the authenticator a username and password hardcoded in the
requestor, with the username and password each being 8 characters because such length
is common [108]. The authenticator receives and decrypts the username and password,
adds salt to the password, hashes (with SHA-256), and verifies that the hash matches its
hardcoded expected hash for the given username.
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The public-key version of coauthentication shown in Figure 3.7 was also implemented to
run over HTTPS configured in the same way. All the coauthentication protocols shown in
Figures 3.1–3.6 sent all public-channel messages over TCP.
All public-channel messages, in all implementations, were sent through standard Wi-Fi
channels. For communicating private-channel messages, that is, messages from the collaborator to the requestor in Figures 3.1–3.3, our implementations used Bluetooth, though it
has known vulnerabilities [109].
Each run of each implementation opened new network connections, including a new
Bluetooth connection in the implementations of Figures 3.1–3.3. Connections were never
reused between runs of the implementations, and the Android applications were restarted
for each run.

4.2.2

Experimental Setup and Results

The implementations were executed on the following devices. The authenticator was
always a MacBook Pro laptop running macOS Sierra version 10.12.6 and having 16GB of
memory and a 2.2GHz Intel quad-core i7 processor. Due to the popularity of mobile access to
authentication services, the requestor was always a smartphone, a Samsung Galaxy s8 Plus
running Android 8.0.0 and having 4GB of memory, a Qualcomm MSM 8998 octa-core (a
2.35GHz quad-core and a 1.9GHz quad-core) processor, and Bluetooth 5. The collaborator
was always a Motorola Nexus 6 running Android 7.1.1 and having 3GB of memory, a 2.7GHz
quad-core Qualcomm Snapdragon 805 processor, and Bluetooth 4.1.
Each of the implementations was run 100 times, in a uniform environment of normal
(workday) university-network usage and standard loads of kernel and user-level applications
running.
The following measurements were made for each run:
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Table 4.3: Average performance of the authentication systems over 100 runs.
Implementation
Password
Figure 3.1
Figure 3.2
Figure 3.3
Figure 3.4
Figure 3.5
Figure 3.6
Figure 3.7

Bytes
Application-Layer Time (ms)
Transmitted Authenticator Requestor Collaborator Total
3212
0.28
1.50
—
1.80
1198
2.58
22.5
18.4
43.5
1088
1.36
20.1
20.9
42.4
885
1.16
17.2
19.4
37.8
835
1.88
6.18
23.5
31.6
1072
1.18
19.1
22.6
42.8
1075
0.94
14.9
23.3
39.1
7158
0.43
2.94
12.9
16.3

Authentication
Time (ms)
136
594
475
473
142
125
131
388

• The network usage, that is, the number of bytes transmitted over the course of the run.
Due to unreliability in the communication channels, the number of bytes transmitted
varied with each run. The network usage was measured with Android’s standard
network-monitoring class android.net.TrafficStats.
• The application-layer real time each device consumed. This measurement was made
by starting a timer when beginning to process any newly received message or request,
stopping the timer when finished preparing a response, taking the difference, and summing all of these times for each device. For example, the application-layer real time
consumed by the authenticator in full coauthentication is the sum of the real times
it consumes processing the requestor’s and collaborator’s messages, including generating new keys and a challenge nonce and performing the required encryptions and
decryptions. Application-layer times exclude all time spent establishing connections
and transmitting messages in the underlying TCP, HTTPS, and Bluetooth protocols.
• The total authentication time. This is the real time, measured on the requestor, from
beginning to prepare an authentication request until finishing obtaining a plaintext
session key.
Tables 4.3–4.4 summarize the results of running each implementation 100 times.
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4.2.3

Performance Analysis

Many of the performance results are as expected. As shown in Table 4.3, protocols
transmitting more or more complex messages, or using HTTPS, transmitted more bytes of
data. Network (non-application-layer) activities dominated the performance of all implementations, consuming between 70% and 98.7% of the total authentication time on average.
As shown in Table 4.4 (CV refers to the coefficient of variation), these network activities
also took a highly variable amount of time to complete, over different runs of the same implementation. The coefficients of variation (CVs) for total authentication time ranged up to
53%, indicating high variance. This variance explains the sometimes-substantial differences
between median and average total authentication times observed for the same implementation. The coefficients of variation for total application-layer times were substantially smaller
for all but the Figure-3.7 implementation, indicating much less variance.
In terms of application-layer performance, the password system was the most efficient
and then the Figure-3.7 public-key system. Both of these systems benefit, at the application
layer, from pushing all the cryptographic operations into the underlying HTTPS layer.
In terms of total authentication time, the Figure-3.6 system outperformed the others on
average, and the outperformance was greater in the median case. The performance of this
coauthentication system benefits from transmitting a minimal number of messages over the
efficient (relative to HTTPS and Bluetooth) TCP.
Importantly, these performance results exclude human time, though it is known to be
substantial for password-based authentication systems. Human entry of a password is expected to take on the order of several seconds [60, 52, 110].
Care should also be exercised when comparing the performance of the password-based system with the performance of the private-channel coauthentication systems (Figures 3.1–3.3),
which update KAR on every authentication. The advantages of updating KAR are analogous
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Table 4.4: Statistics on the performance of the authentication systems.
Implementation
Password
Figure 3.1
Figure 3.2
Figure 3.3
Figure 3.4
Figure 3.5
Figure 3.6
Figure 3.7

Total Application-Layer Time
Average (ms) Median (ms) CV
1.80
1.80
0.08
43.5
42.5
0.23
42.4
41.4
0.27
37.8
37.4
0.31
31.6
30.4
0.22
42.8
39.6
0.29
39.1
37.7
0.28
16.3
13.5
0.33

Total Authentication Time
Average (ms) Median (ms) CV
136
132
0.23
594
564
0.26
475
430
0.38
473
426
0.45
142
130
0.53
125
117
0.36
131
93.4
0.49
388
388
0.16

to the advantages of updating a password, so a better comparison would take into account
the time required to update passwords. Password update is expected to take on the order of
a minute of human time [111], significantly longer than an automatic coauthentication-key
update.
We conclude from these results that coauthentication performs efficiently enough to be
practical.
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CHAPTER 5
SQL-IDENTIFIER INJECTION ATTACKS

This chapter

5.1

1

defines SQL-IDIAs and presents example SQL-IDIAs.

Definition of SQL-IDIAs
SQL-IDIA-vulnerable applications are applications that can form a valid SQL statement

by concatenating a user-input identifier into the statement.
Definition 1. An application is vulnerable to a SQL-IDIA iff the application constructs a
SQL statement S by concatenating an untrusted input i into S and there exists an identifier
x such that concatenating x into S in place of i causes S to be a valid SQL statement.
For example, the application excerpted in Figure 5.1a is vulnerable to a SQL-IDIA because it can create a valid SQL statement by concatenating an identifier into the statement,
as shown in Figure 5.1b.
A SQL-IDIA occurs when a SQL-IDIA-vulnerable application—which would produce a
valid SQL statement by concatenating a user-input identifier into the statement—instead
concatenates a non-identifier, or an invalid identifier, into the statement in place of a valid
identifier.
Definition 2. A SQL-IDIA occurs in a SQL-IDIA-vulnerable application iff the concatenated input i either is not an identifier or is an identifier that, when concatenated into S,
makes S an invalid SQL statement.
1

Parts of this chapter is published in IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security [5].
Permission to use the material is provided in Appendix A.
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String sql = "SELECT * FROM Contact ORDER BY " + userInput;
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(sql);
(a) An example Java program vulnerable to SQL-IDIAs.

SELECT * FROM Contact ORDER BY firstName
(b) The output SQL program when the userInput is a valid column name.

(CASE WHEN (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM Demographic WHERE firstName='John' AND lastName
='Doe') > 0 THEN Contact.lastName ELSE Contact.firstName END)
(c) A malicious input through the userInput to perform a SQL-IDIA.

Figure 5.1: An order-by-based SQL-IDIA.

For example, a SQL-IDIA occurs when the SQL-IDIA-vulnerable application excerpted
in Figure 5.1a is provided the input shown in Figure 5.1c. In this case the untrusted input
(Figure 5.1c) is concatenated into the output SQL statement at a position in which an
identifier could be valid, yet the untrusted input is not a valid identifier; hence, a SQL-IDIA
has occurred.
Definition 2 also considers invalid-identifier injections to be SQL-IDIAs because such injections can leak sensitive database-schema information [112, 113]. For example, an attacker
might input a nonexistent column name into the application shown in Figure 5.1a to cause
the DBMS (Database Management System) to raise an exception when executing the generated invalid SQL statement. As with traditional SQLIAs, in cases in which the DBMS raises
an exception, the application may output information contained in the exception object to
leak database schema such as the database name or the SQL statement being executed.
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String sql = "SELECT * FROM Customer WHERE " + userInput1 + " BETWEEN ? AND ?";
PreparedStatement stmt = conn.prepareStatement(sql);
stmt.setInt(1, userInput2);
stmt.setInt(2, userInput3);
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();
(a) An example Java program vulnerable to SQL-IDIAs.

age BETWEEN ? AND ? UNION SELECT * FROM Admin-(b) A malicious input through the userInput1 to perform a SQL-IDIA.

SELECT * FROM Customer WHERE age BETWEEN ? AND ? UNION SELECT * FROM Admin -BETWEEN ? AND ?
(c) The output SQL program with the malicious input (b).

Figure 5.2: A column-name-based SQL-IDIA.

Although this dissertation focuses on SQL, identifier-injection attacks are possible in
other languages such as XML, Javascript, PHP, and Python.

5.2

Additional Examples
To provide additional familiarity with SQL-IDIAs, we next consider two additional ex-

amples, shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. Both of these examples, as well as the example shown
in Figure 5.1, are abbreviated and simplified versions of actual Java applications found by
our automated GitHub analysis tool, described in Chapter 6.
Figure 5.2a shows a program that is vulnerable to a column-name-based SQL-IDIA. In
this program, two user-inputs fill placeholders using prepared statements; therefore, SQLIAs
are not possible through these inputs. However, a column-name parameter (i.e., userInput1)
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String sql = "INSERT INTO " + userInput + "(isAdmin) VALUES ('False')";
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
stmt.executeUpdate(sql);
(a) A SQL-IDIA-vulnerable program through the table name.

Customer (name, isAdmin) VALUES ('Mallory', 'True'); DELETE FROM Admin; -(b) A malicious input through the userInput to perform SQL-IDIAs.

INSERT INTO Customer (name, isAdmin) VALUES ('Mallory', 'True'); DELETE FROM
Admin; -- (isAdmin) VALUES ('False')
(c) The output SQL program with the malicious input (b).

Figure 5.3: A table-name-based SQL-IDIA.

is concatenated into the SQL statement. In normal cases, this program expects the concatenated parameter to be a valid column name. However, attackers can perform SQL-IDIAs by
injecting carefully crafted SQL statements. For instance, the program (Figure 5.2a) outputs
the SQL code shown in Figure 5.2c with the malicious input shown in Figure 5.2b. This output program can maliciously return all entries from the Admin table (assuming the Customer
and Admin tables have the same attributes). The malicious input is not a valid column in
the Customer table, so Definition 2 correctly considers this input to be a SQL-IDIA.
Figure 5.3a shows a program that is vulnerable to a table-name-based SQL-IDIA. This
program concatenates a table-name parameter (i.e., userInput) into a SQL statement and
executes this statement using the standard JDBC (Java Database Connectivity) executeupdate function. If an attacker injects the malicious input presented in Figure 5.3b through
the table-name parameter, the program (Figure 5.3a) outputs the two consecutive SQL
statements shown in Figure 5.3c. These statements cause two different attacks. The first
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attack adds a new user to the Customer table as an administrator by changing the hardcoded
admin value. The second attack—an example of piggy-backing attacks—deletes all entries
from the Admin table; the malicious input presented in Figure 5.3b causes the Java program
to execute multiple queries at once.
The existing JDBC API attempts to mitigate piggy-backing attacks by requiring the
execute-update function to only execute one SQL statement at a time. The API provides
different functions to execute multiple statements as a batch. However, in practice, some
JDBC implementations do not faithfully follow the API specifications. We tested this SQLIDIA with three different JDBC implementations: H2, SQLite, and MySQL JDBC drivers.
Our results showed that these drivers, except the MySQL driver, are vulnerable to this
attack. On the other hand, Definition 2 correctly classifies the input shown in Figure 5.3b
as an attack because this input is not a valid table in the database.
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CHAPTER 6
PREVALENCE OF SQL-INJECTION AND SQL-IDENTIFIER INJECTION
ATTACKS

This chapter 1 presents an analysis of source files from GitHub and shows SQL-IDIAs on
a deployed web application. This GitHub analysis investigates that how SQL statements are
constructed in practice and how many of the files are vulnerable to SQLIAs and SQL-IDIAs.

6.1

Research Questions
To understand the prevalence of SQLIAs and SQL-IDIAs, we ask the following research

questions:
R1 What percentage of source files use prepared statements, string concatenation, or hardcoded strings for constructing SQL statements?
R2 What percentage of source files use both prepared statements and string concatenation
in the same file?
R3 What percentage of source files use identifier concatenation for constructing SQL statements?
R4 What type of identifiers are the most commonly concatenated?
Our GitHub analysis provides empirical answers to these questions.
1

Parts of this chapter is published in IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security [5].
Permission to use the material is provided in Appendix A.
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Output
java

Source Code
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{RegEx}

(has StrConcat.,
has P repState.,
has Hardcoded)

Figure 6.1: The operation of the source file analyzer.

6.2

Dataset Collection
We collected a dataset of source files from GitHub, which is the most popular plat-

form to publish open source projects. We used Java source files because Java is one of the
most commonly used programming languages [114]. We used GitHub Archive [115] because
the GitHub website provides limited access to all source files. GitHub Archive is a public
database that collects all public GitHub activities (e.g., source files, commits, pull requests)
since 2011. Google BigQuery [116], which provides an interface to perform database operations on large data, was utilized to access GitHub Archive.
Each file in our dataset contains SQL statements. To determine the files that contain
SQL statements, we filtered GitHub Archive with certain keywords (i.e., “executeQuery”,
“executeUpdate”, “createQuery”, and “createNativeQuery”). These keywords are used to
execute SQL statements in Java. It is noteworthy that these keywords are the functions
of the well-known database libraries [117]. To minimize redundancy and false positives, we
only considered parent projects (i.e., the projects that are not forked from other projects)
and eliminated unit-test files. Our final dataset contains 120,412 Java source files, obtained
by filtering 56.7 million Java files.

6.3

Identifying SQL Usages
We developed an automated tool to determine SQL usages in each source file. Figure 6.1

depicts the source file analysis operation using this automated tool. As shown in the figure,
this tool takes an individual Java source file as an input, matches regular expressions to
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identify how SQL statements are constructed in the file, and outputs SQL-construction
types in three categories. The first category is the dynamic SQL-statement construction
using string concatenation (e.g., "SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=" + userInput). The
second category is the dynamic SQL statement construction with prepared statements (e.g.,
"SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=?"). The last category is the static SQL-statement usage
with hardcoded string literals (e.g., "SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=5").
These SQL-construction categories are detected with rules that are encoded in regular
expressions. If one of the following rules is matched, a file is classified as belonging to the
string concatenation category.
• Concatenating a string literal with a Java identifier (e.g., a variable name) using the
plus operator, where the string literal contains SQL keywords. For example, this rule
matches "SELECT * FROM " + userInput.
• Using at least two append functions, where at least one of the append function takes
a Java identifier as an argument and the other takes a string literal containing SQL
keywords. For example, this rule matches append ("SELECT * FROM ") .append(
userInput).
• Using a Java string-format function that contains at least one string literal with SQL
keywords and string-format placeholders. For example, this rule matches String.
format ( "SELECT * FROM %s", userInput).
To determine prepared-statement usage, we encoded a rule that matches a string literal
containing SQL keywords and prepared-statement placeholders (i.e., ? and :name). A file is
considered as using hardcoded SQL-statements if the file (1) does not contain a string concatenation to form SQL statements, (2) does not contain prepared statements, and (3) only
contains string literals with SQL keywords.
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(a) SQL-construction statistics of 120,412 Java source files.
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(b) Injection-attack vulnerabilities of 120,412 Java
source files.

Figure 6.2: SQL-construction and injection-attack vulnerability statistics.

These SQL-construction categories determine the files that are vulnerable to SQLIAs and
SQL-IDIAs. Assume that the concatenated variables are propagated from untrusted inputs.
Then, the source file is considered as vulnerable if it uses at least one string concatenation
to construct SQL statements [15, 14]. If a source file does not use string concatenation and
employs prepared statements and/or hardcoded SQL-statements, then the file is considered
as not vulnerable.

6.4

Empirical Results
This section discusses the prevalence of SQLIAs and SQL-IDIAs by empirically answering

each of the research questions.
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R1 What percentage of source files use prepared statements, string concatenation, or
hardcoded strings for constructing SQL statements?
Figure 6.2a summarizes the SQL-usage statistics of 120,412 Java source files that contain
SQL statements. 30.3% of the files construct SQL statements using string concatenation,
30.6% of the files employ prepared statements to form SQL statements, and 22.4% of the
files only use hardcoded SQL statements. These results reveal that a significant portion of
source files are vulnerable to SQLIAs through string concatenation.
R2 What percentage of source files use both prepared statements and string concatenation
in the same file?
Interestingly, 16.7% of the files have both string concatenation and prepared statements.
The following answer to R3 shows that one reason for using both string concatenation and
prepared statements in the same file is the identifier limitation of the existing preparedstatement API.
One unusual reason for using both string concatenation and prepared statements in the
same file is that the cases requiring extra inconvenient steps to apply prepared statements.
For example, the usage of the LIKE operator. This operator is used for searching texts
with specified patterns in columns. However, SQL syntax does not allow these patterns
to be defined in the prepared statement. Instead, these patterns can be (1) dynamically
concatenated with an untrusted input and then (2) the concatenated-input can be used
to fill the placeholder in the prepared statement. Our analysis reveals that 1.4% of files
concatenate strings to construct SQL clauses with LIKE operators.
R3 What percentage of source files use identifier concatenation for constructing SQL
statements?
Based on the GitHub analysis, 9.6% of the files use only identifier concatenation to form
SQL statements. Additionally, 6.1% of the files concatenate identifiers and also employ
prepared statements for values in the same file.
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R4 What type of identifiers are the most commonly concatenated?
We analyzed the types of identifiers (e.g., table, column, index, function, procedure
names) being concatenated. Based on the analysis, 96% of the identifiers were table and
column names.
As a result, the GitHub analysis revealed that identifier concatenation is a real problem.
As shown in Figure 6.2b, 15.7% of the files are vulnerable to SQL-IDIAs. In addition, 31.3%
of the files are vulnerable to SQLIAs through string concatenation.

6.5

Attacking a Deployed Application
We present SQL-IDIAs on a large-scale Electronic Medical Record software. As of March

17, 2019, this open-source software is actively maintained and has 21,844 total commits, 61
contributors, and 23 stars at GitHub. Features of this software include managing confidential
patient and medication records, scheduling appointments, and managing hospital-related
tasks. Our GitHub analysis showed that a Java file in this software concatenates an identifier
to form a SQL statement. By manually inspecting the source code, we were able to verify
that this software is indeed vulnerable to SQL-IDIAs. We set up an attack environment
by running this Electronic Medical Record software on a local computer and creating a
test database. Although we have disclosed the identified vulnerability, we do not name the
software here because it is widely deployed, and because the vulnerability has not been
resolved (as of March 17, 2019).
The software has a web page used to search for employees in a clinic. Users can type a
search keyword through this web page, and the software runs the code shown in abbreviated
form in Figure 6.3a. The keyword parameter is used with prepared statements; therefore, a
SQLIA is not possible through this parameter. However, this program takes the userInput
parameter for the order-by clause from a hidden form in the web page. Thus, attackers can
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String sql = "SELECT * FROM Contact WHERE lastName LIKE ? ORDER BY " + userInput;
PreparedStatement stmt = conn.prepareStatement(sql);
stmt.setString(1, keyword);
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();
(a) An abbreviated version of actual SQL-IDIA-vulnerable code in Electronic Medical Record software.

(CASE WHEN (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM Demographic WHERE firstName='John' AND lastName
='Doe') > 0 THEN Contact.lastName ELSE Contact.firstName END)
(b) A malicious input through the userInput parameter to test the patient name in the database.

(CASE WHEN (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM Demographic WHERE firstName='John' AND lastName
='Doe' AND demographicNo<5) > 0 THEN Contact.lastName ELSE Contact.firstName
END)
(c) A malicious input through the userInput parameter to determine the unique identifier of the patient in
the database.

(CASE WHEN (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM Appointment WHERE demographicNo=1 AND reasonCode
<5) > 0 THEN Contact.lastName ELSE Contact.firstName END)
(d) A malicious input through the userInput parameter to determine the patient’s doctor-visit reason.

Figure 6.3: SQL-IDIAs on Electronic Medical Record software.

perform SQL-IDIAs through this order-by parameter by changing the source of the web page
in a web browser.
In our first example attack, we injected the SQL expression shown in Figure 6.3b through
the order-by parameter to determine whether a person named John Doe is a patient in the
clinic. If John Doe appears in the Demographic table, the search result from the Contact
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table was sorted by the last name; otherwise, the result was sorted by the first name. This
enabled us to determine that John Doe is a patient in the clinic.
To access other confidential information, we need to determine the unique identifier (i.e.,
demographicNo) of John Doe from the Demographic table. This identifier, which manages
the relations between tables, can be extracted by injecting the code shown in Figure 6.3c.
This code tests whether the unique identifier of John Doe is less than 5. Performing a binary
search allowed us to determine the actual value (i.e., 1) of the unique identifier.
The extracted unique identifier of John can be used to obtain additional confidential
information from other tables. For example, the code presented in Figure 6.3d maliciously
detects John’s doctor-visit reason. We determined, via binary search, that the reason code
for John’s doctor visit was 7. With manual inspection of the reason codes in the open source
project, we were able to determine that the visit was made for HIV testing.
This technique is not limited to the attacks above. The same technique can be used to extract different confidential information about patients such as medication history, laboratory
test results, patient address, or the room that a patient is occupying.

6.6

Threats to Validity
Our GitHub-analysis methodology is based on pattern matching in single files. This ap-

proach relies on the assumption that concatenated variables are propagated from untrusted
inputs. This assumption was made because determining the input source for concatenated
variables would require techniques such as data flow analysis [118] and compiler optimization [119]. These techniques require source files to be compiled, thus they cannot be applied
to our analysis. This limitation exists because our dataset only contains independent source
files, not the whole projects and their dependencies.
To estimate the performance of our GitHub-analysis results, we randomly selected and
manually inspected 200 source files. The false positive is determined when the tool says
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there is a string concatenation in the file, but in reality (1) the string concatenation is not
used to form a SQL statement, (2) the concatenated variable is inside of the file (e.g., a SQL
statement is concatenated with a static field), or (3) the concatenated variable is commented
out. The false negative is determined when the tool says there is no string concatenation
in the file, but there is actually at least one SQL statement that is created using string
concatenation, and the concatenated variable is coming from outside of the source file. To
estimate the accuracy, we calculated the proportion of true results (i.e., true positive and
negative rates) in all results.
This methodology was used to estimate the performance of our analysis. The false
positive rate, false negative rate, and the accuracy of our GitHub analysis are 18%, 7%,
and 87%, respectively. The obtained results are promising. However, these results, similarly
to existing research relying on GitHub data, may suffer from different threats as discussed
in [120].
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CHAPTER 7
PREVENTING SQL-IDENTIFIER INJECTION ATTACKS

In this chapter 1 , we introduce a new extended prepared-statement API. This API
• enables prepare statements to fill placeholders with table and column names,
• prevents SQL-IDIAs,
• does not leak schema information, and
• does not have limitations that the input-sanitation-based approaches have.
This section also demonstrates the implementability, efficiency, and effectiveness of the
extended API by presenting an empirical evaluation of a prototype implementation.

7.1

API Functions
To prevent SQL-IDIAs, we introduce the following two functions that can be added to

the prepared-statement APIs (e.g., Java JDBC [121], PHP PDO [122]).
• setColumnName(int parameterIndex, String columnName): takes a column name
and its index as arguments,
• setTableName(int parameterIndex, String tableName): takes a table name and
its index as arguments,
1

Parts of this chapter is published in IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security [5].
Permission to use the material is provided in Appendix A.
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A possible implementation of these functions consists of three main steps. First, these
functions can be added to the prepared-statement API and its corresponding database driver
(e.g., the MySQL JDBC Driver). The implementation of these new functions in this step
is similar to the existing prepared-statement functions, such as setString. Typically, when
these new functions are called, their parameters can be stored in an array with parameter
indices. These indices indicate the placeholder positions in SQL statements.
Second, the SQL-statement preparation phase for identifiers can be implemented in the
DBMS. The standard preparation phase contains two main steps: (1) parsing the SQL
statement, and (2) generating an execution plan. The implementation of the parsing step
may require changing the SQL syntax of the database in some cases. For example, the
syntax does not need to be changed if the databases allow placeholders anywhere in the
SQL-statement. The syntax has to be modified to allow placeholders for table and columns
if the database syntax only allows certain clauses to have placeholders.
The execution-plan-generation step can include schema verification and statement optimization. In the schema verification, the DBMS checks whether the table and column
names in the SQL-statements are valid. For example, given the statement SELECT id FROM
Customer, the DBMS checks whether the Customer table is in the database and id is an
attribute of the Customer table. Although the DBMS can still verify and optimize the nonparameterized table and column names in this step, the verification of parameterized table
and column names must be performed while executing the prepared statement.
The last step can involve filling the placeholders with identifiers while executing the prepared statement. This step starts by checking whether dynamic identifiers belong to the
schema. The checking operation is straightforward in the case of column names because the
DBMS only needs to ensure that a given column belongs to an appropriate table. Dynamically checking table names requires further verification including verifying whether the table
belongs to the schema as well as ensuring that the already existing attributes in the SQL
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Figure 7.1: Preventing SQL-IDIAs with the extended prepared-statement API.

statement belong to the given table. Once the verification is complete, the DBMS can create
an expression for each parameterized identifier and place these expressions into the prepared
statement.
We only considered table and column names in our extended API because our GitHub
analysis showed that 96% of the concatenated identifiers were table and column names.

7.1.1

Benefits of the Extended API

An illustration of the systems that are vulnerable to SQL-IDIAs due to the usage of
existing prepared-statement APIs is shown in Figure 7.1a. As can be seen, an application
(1) takes literals and identifiers as inputs, (2) fills placeholders with literals using prepared
statements, and (3) concatenates identifiers to construct SQL statements. The identifier
concatenation causes applications to have SQL-IDIA vulnerabilities.
As illustrated in Figure 7.1b, the extended API prevents SQL-IDIAs by filling placeholders with identifiers using prepared statements. Applications can create placeholders for
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identifiers using the extended prepared-statement API, and the API only allows these placeholders to be filled with valid identifiers. Thus, attackers are not able to perform SQL-IDIAs.
The extended API prevents DBMSs from leaking sensitive schema information by performing a default operation when the input column or table name does not exist in the
database. For example, if a parameterized column name is used in an order-by clause and
the column name is invalid, the DBMS will order the results by the first column in the table.
This operation prevents the information-leakage attack described in Chapter 5.
In addition, these extended API functions do not suffer from the drawbacks of inputsanitation-based approaches. For example, as described in Chapter 2, incorrect updates to
whitelists or blacklists may introduce false positives or false negatives. The extended API
functions eliminate such false positives or negatives by dynamically verifying given table and
column names in databases before filling placeholders.

7.2

Empirical Evaluation
A prototype of the extended prepared-statement API was implemented, and the imple-

mentation was compared with an existing equivalent prepared-statement function as well as
ad hoc whitelisting solutions.

7.2.1

Implementation

We implemented a prototype of the setColumnName function into the H2 JDBC library [123]. H2 is an open-source relational database management system that is written in
Java.
The implementation enables order-by clauses to have column names through the new
setColumnName function. In our implementation, we have not modified H2’s SQL syntax
because it allows order-by clauses to have placeholders for values; in fact, order-by clauses
can take numerical column indices as parameters with prepared statements.
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String sql = "SELECT * FROM TestTable WHERE col2 < 100 ORDER BY ? ASC";
PreparedStatement stmt = conn.prepareStatement(sql);
stmt.setColumnName(1, userInput);
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();
Figure 7.2: Usage of the new setColumnName function.

Figure 7.2 shows a program that employs the implemented setColumnName function.
This program selects entries from a table and orders them by the given column name. At
prepare time, when the prepare-statement function is executed, the H2 DBMS parses the SQL
statement and creates a query structure having a placeholder for the order-by parameter.
When the setColumnName is executed, the DBMS stores the column name parameter with
its index in an array. Once the execute-query function is executed, the DBMS first validates
the column name. If the given column name is invalid, i.e., does not belong to the table,
the DBMS sorts the results by the first column in the table to prevent information-leakage
attacks through error messages. If the column is valid, the DBMS (1) dynamically creates a
column expression, (2) appends this expression to the query structure, and (3) executes the
query.

7.2.2

Experimental Setup

We compared our setColumnName implementation with three different implementations:
an existing prepared-statement function and two different ad hoc implementations. Our
implementation executes the query shown in Figure 7.2, and the three other implementations
execute equivalent queries. Hence, all of the implementations return the same result-set in
the same order when the input is the same.
To establish a baseline, we used the existing prepared-statement API’s setInt function
that takes an int-literal as a parameter. By filling the placeholder shown in Figure 7.2 with
a column index using the setInt function, we were able to create an equivalent query with
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setColumnName. We could not use other existing prepared-statement functions because
an equivalent query cannot be created with any other functions. We also compared our
implementation with two different ad hoc solutions. The first ad hoc implementation uses a
static-whitelist (i.e., a hash set that contains all column names in the table). The second ad
hoc implementation employs a dynamic-whitelist by first querying whether the given column
name exists in the database and then executing the actual query.
The setColumnName and setInt implementations prepare a statement once and execute
the statement 100 times. The ad hoc implementations prepare and execute the statement
100 times because column names had to be concatenated into queries. In each execution,
we measured the execution time, that is, the real-time. For the first two prepared-statement
implementations, the real-time is measured from beginning to setting placeholders and executing the query until finishing obtaining a result-set from the database. For the ad hoc
implementations, the real-time is measured from beginning to preparing a statement and
executing the query until finishing obtaining a result-set from the database.
We tested all four implementations using a uniform environment. The testing database
has a table that contains 100 columns and 1000 rows. Each cell of the table was filled
with a random number between 0 and 1000. These random numbers were generated using the standard Java random number library. We used the H2 DBMS to implement the
database-relevant operations. All experiments were performed on a MacBook Pro laptop
that runs macOS Sierra version 10.12.6 with 16GB of memory and a 2.2GHz Intel quad-core
i7 processor.
We conducted three sets of experiments to test the performance of the implementations.
In the first experiment, each implementation was given the same column name or column
index. In the second experiment, a randomly chosen valid column name or index was given
to each implementation in each run, to eliminate caching. In the last experiment, each
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Table 7.1: Average execution times of the implementations over 100 runs.

Implementation
New setColumnName
Existing setInt
Static Whitelist
Dynamic Whitelist

Execution Time (ms)
Same Input Random Input Bad Input
2.11
2.25
2.04
2.13
2.29
1.11
2.08
2.18
2.29
2.37
4.73
4.07

implementation was given a “bad” input, meaning a randomly chosen column that is not an
attribute of the table.

7.2.3

Experimental Results

Table 7.1 summarizes the performance results of the four implementations. Our implementation has no extra performance overhead over the existing prepared-statement setInt
function when the input is the same or a random input is provided. For the bad inputs,
setInt outperformed setColumnName because setInt does not retrieve a result set from the
table and instead throws an exception containing sensitive schema information. In contrast,
our implementation returns a result set that is sorted by the first column in the table to
prevent information-leakage attacks.
In all experiments, the new setColumnName function outperformed the dynamic-whitelist
implementation. The static-whitelist implementation slightly outperformed the new set
column name function in two experiments. Although this ad hoc approach has a slight
performance advantage, whitelisting approaches may introduce nontrivial complexities into
application code and may lead to false positives (see Chapter 2).
To test the effectiveness of our implementation, we mounted the order-by-based SQLIDIAs described in Figures 5.1 and 6.3, and the information-leakage attack described in
Chapter 5. The new setColumnName function successfully prevented all of these attacks.
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To summarize, filling placeholders with column names (1) is practical and efficient as
compared to the existing ad hoc approaches, (2) does not introduce extra performance
overheads as compared to the existing prepared-statement functions, and (3) is effective
against SQL-IDIAs.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation addressed two “most critical” web-application security vulnerabilities
by presenting (1) a novel authentication technique called coauthentication and (2) a class of
SQL-Injection attacks called SQL-Identifier injection attack [1].

8.1

Summary
The coauthentication protocols and system designs have several potential benefits. Coau-

thentication:
• protects against compromise of any one authentication secret, similar to multi-factor
techniques but without the inconveniences of having to enter passwords (including
OTPs) or scan biometrics;
• requires little, and in some implementations no, interaction from users;
• mitigates phishing, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks (there are no passwords to
phish, and the attack models assume active attackers);
• bases authentications on high-entropy secrets that can be generated, exchanged, stored,
updated, and used automatically and efficiently (in contrast with password and biometric secrets);
• can implement advanced functionalities, including m-out-of-n, shared-device, continuous, group, and anonymous authentications;
72

• has formally verified security properties;
• has been implemented and found to perform efficiently enough to be practical;
• can be combined with additional authentication factors;
• provides protocols that may benefit existing multi-device authentication systems, such
as those based on OTPs.
Another benefit of coauthentication is its ability to reset secrets automatically. With
existing systems, if a nonuser does obtain the required secrets, then resetting the secrets
is laborious (e.g., for the victim to reset a password), expensive (e.g., to send the user a
new physical token), or impractical (e.g., to give a user new fingerprints, retinas, vocal
profile, etc). In contrast, coauthentication secrets may be cryptographic keys stored on
registered devices; these keys may be reset, and periodically updated, automatically. These
keys can also be generated to have high entropy, without concern for whether users can
create, memorize, or enter the high-entropy secrets.
Because users never enter coauthentication secrets, these secrets cannot be phished by
convincing users to enter them. In contrast, passwords are often obtained by convincing
users to enter them as part of phishing attacks [59].
Given these benefits, coauthentication, or a multi-factor authentication with coauthentication as the physical-token factor, may be advantageous for some authentication applications.
This dissertation has also defined SQL-IDIAs and demonstrated example SQL-IDIAs on
deployed software. To prevent SQL-IDIAs, a new extended prepared-statement API was
proposed. This API
• extends the safe use of prepared statements by filling placeholders with table and
column names,
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• prevents SQL-IDIAs,
• does not leak schema information on invalid inputs,
• does not have drawbacks that existing input-sanitation-based solutions have,
• has been prototyped, and found to perform efficiently and effectively, and
• can be utilized by the existing automatic prepared-statement-generation tools.
The prevalence of SQL-IDIAs was determined by GitHub SQL-construction analysis. The
GitHub analysis showed that 15.7% of the SQL-constructing Java source files considered are
vulnerable to SQL-IDIAs. These SQL-IDIA vulnerabilities can be prevented with successful
adoption of the proposed extended prepared-statement API.

8.2

Future Work
This section addresses several possible research directions.

8.2.1

Quantum Coauthentication

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a technique for sharing secret keys using quantum
mechanics [124, 125]. QKD systems use classical and quantum channels to distribute secret
keys between two distant devices. The security of QKD techniques relies on the no-cloning
theorem [126, 127]. Based on the no-cloning theorem, any measurement on a quantum
channel will disturb the original message. Therefore, passive attacks such as eavesdropping
attempts become noticeable by receivers [128]. However, QKD schemes are still vulnerable
to active attacks such as man-in-the-middle [128].
To mitigate active attacks many quantum authentication schemes have been proposed
(e.g., [129, 130, 131]). These schemes can be implemented using many different approaches
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including quantum entanglement, polarization states, or combination of quantum and classical cryptographic techniques. As far as we are aware, all of these approaches still rely on the
no-cloning theorem to mitigate active attacks. Although these techniques mitigate active
attacks, an eavesdropping attempt may disturb the original message, therefore resulting in
a denial-of-service attack.
One avenue for future work may be to investigate the quantum coauthentication techniques that can mitigate denial-of-service attacks using multiple registered quantum devices.

8.2.2

Parallel Security-Protocol Verification

Automated protocol verification plays a vital role to verify security properties of network
protocols [132]. In this dissertation, we used ProVerif, which is one of the most popular
tools to verify protocols, to verify coauthentication protocols. However, ProVerif verified
the complex m-out-of-n coauthentication protocols in approximately 6 weeks. Based on our
observation, ProVerif only uses a single processing core to verify a protocol property.
Another possible avenue for future work may focus on verifying security protocols in
parallel. That is, multiple processing cores may work together to verify a single security
property. A plug-in to ProVerif, that enables the usage of multiple cores, may improve the
complex-security-protocol verification performance.

8.2.3

Additional Modifications to the Prepared-Statements APIs

Another future direction can be the additional modifications to prepared statements for
mitigating SQLIAs. For example, our Github analysis showed that 1.4% of files concatenate
strings to construct SQL clauses with LIKE operators. Although the existing preparedstatement functions can be used with LIKE operators, as discussed in Chapter 6, using
prepared statements with LIKE operators requires extra inconvenient development-steps.
Another avenue for future work may investigate developers’ behaviors on possible inconve75

nient steps, and introduce additional functions to the prepared statements that eliminate
these extra inconvenient steps.
This future work can also consider implementing the new API functions and extensively
evaluating their performance. The performance of each new function may be different. For
example, dynamically setting a table name may take more time than a column name. The
performance difference between API functions may exist because dynamically setting table
name requires more checks (e.g., checking all attributes belong to the table) than dynamically
setting column name. Additionally, each SQL clause may have different performance results.
For example, using the setColumnName function might be faster for order by than select
clauses. Such a performance analysis can be used for fine-tuning SQL queries.

8.2.4

Compiling Source Files Without Dependencies

Our GitHub-analysis results rely on pattern matching in single files. To reduce false
positive and negatives, data flow analysis and compiler optimization techniques can be implemented in single source files. To implement these techniques, the source files are needed
to be compiled. As far as we are aware, there is no such a technique that can compile a single
source file without having its dependencies. It would be useful to develop such a system that
can compile single source files and perform SQL-construction analysis based on data flow
analysis.
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